Of the many changes which have come in the wake of Egypt’s historic January 25th Revolution, perhaps the most prominent is the explosion of grassroots political organization. The young activists which thronged Cairo’s Tahrir Square have now begun the process of channeling their energies into the formation of political parties (PPs) and civil society organizations, seeking to integrate themselves within Egypt’s emergent democracy and preserve the momentum of the popular revolution.
Shortly after these historic events, the ruling National Democratic Party was banned, and in March of 2011 the interim Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a new Political Party Law which removed many of the arbitrary and restrictive provisions. A deluge of new applications has been submitted since March, with several long-standing applications (such as that of the al-Wasat al-Gadeed Party) approved and many more currently under review. Our interviews suggest that some 34 new PPS are currently pursuing registration.
Already, however, inequalities in capacity and resources are emerging among these would-be parties. Many of the PPs are being formed by activists and politicians galvanized by the Revolution, but who lack the managerial and organizational capacities to run their parties. For many, merely collecting the 5,000 founding members needed for registration is a paramount challenge. Interviewees familiar with the political landscape feel that only six or seven of the PPs awaiting registration will cross these hurdles in time for the parliamentary and presidential elections looming at the end of the year. Other would-be parties, however, benefit from greater resources and institutional reach. Moreover, those parties that had operated underground pre-Revolution benefit from their existing networks and organizational experience.
Accompanying the growth in potential PPs is a wide variety of civil society organizations, political associations, and labor groups. Many of these entities were marginalized and intimidated in the pre-Revolution environment, but now see opportunity for legitimization and organization. Still others entail nascent coalitions and alliances of youth eager to join political life but who do not necessarily want to join a PP. Though some have long-term political party aspirations, these organizations operate in the civil sphere and some aspire to the role of Political Action Committees found in American politics. Nevertheless, these groups share many of the same managerial and organizational needs as PPs – as well as the same challenges, including a lack of management capacity and the absence of the requisite systems for internal management, human resources, communications, and finance.
It seems that in the post-Revolution political environment, the challenges to PPs and associations have shifted from the restrictive “gate keeping” of a dominant party to managerial and organizational challenges – from political challenges to productivity challenges. These challenges threaten to recreate a political environment in which success is available only to a small cadre of amply-resourced parties and organizations, thus dispelling the populist and democratic potential enabled by the Revolution.
How can the playing field be leveled without privileging one proto-party over another and tipping the scales of Egypt’s nascent democracy? Contact OHK to learn more about our White Paper proposing mechanisms for capacity-building and technical assistance.